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Comment
Allowing Genocide?: An Analysis of Armed
.Activities on the Territory of the Congo,
Jurisdictional Reservations, and the
Legitimacy of the International Court of
Justice
Dan Hammer*
In 1994, Rwandan troops occupied the northern territory of
the Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC"), killing, massacring,
and raping the native inhabitants' in the name of bringing war
criminals to justice.2 In 2002, over 6,000 Rwandan troops
remained, supporting a Congolese rebel group which had
committed a series of massacres. 3 By then, the militias were
responsible for the deaths of over 2.5 million people, and the
conflict had involved troops from seven different African
countries.4
On May 28, 2002, the Government of the DRC filed a prayer
for relief with the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), alleging
that Rwanda had engaged in "massive, serious and flagrant
* J.D., Expected 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2005, University of
Wisconsin. The author would like to thank his editor, Ryan Schildkraut, along with
the rest of the editors and staff, for their valuable assistance throughout the process.
1. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), 2006 ICJ LEXIS 1, at *12 (Order of Feb. 3, 2006).
2. Marc Lacey, Congo Tires of War But End Not In Sight, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2002, at A3.
3. Id.
4. Henri E. Cauvin, Rwanda and Congo Sign Accord to End War, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2002, at A8. The countries involved were the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda,
Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
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violations of human rights and of international humanitarian
law."5 Rwanda responded by arguing that it never agreed to be
subject to ICJ jurisdiction under the treaty.6 In the ensuing
case, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ
agreed with Rwanda and held that Rwanda's jurisdictional
reservation 7 was valid.8
By ruling that jurisdictional reservations are valid, the ICJ
not only dismissed the DRC's claim against Rwanda, but also
established the precedent that the ICJ will not enforce treaty
obligations unless both parties have consented to ICJ
jurisdiction. The decision directly affects both jurisdictional
reservations under the Genocide Convention and, by extension,
jurisdictional reservations in all treaties under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 9  Both the Vienna
Convention and the Genocide Convention allow reservations to
a treaty so long as the reservations are not "incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty."10  By ruling that
5. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), 2006 ICJ LEXIS 1, at *12 (Order of Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icrw/ijudgment/icrw-ijudgment-20060203.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
6. Id. at *24.
7. A reservation is a "formal declaration, upon signing or ratifying a treaty,
that [a state's] willingness to become a party to [a] treaty is conditioned on certain
additional terms that will limit the effect of the treaty in some way." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 607 (2d pocket ed. 2001). A jurisdictional reservation, therefore, is a
statement by a signatory state that it intends the jurisdictional provisions of the
treaty to be understood in a particular, limited, way.
8. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2006 ICJ LEXIS at *62 ("In
the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot conclude that the
reservation of Rwanda in question, which is meant to exclude a particular method of
settling a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment [sic] of the
Convention, is to be regarded as being incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Convention.").
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna
Convention is a treaty regime devoted to developing international rules for the
interpretation and implementation of treaties. The Vienna Convention does not
apply to the Armed Activities case because it had not entered into force before the
DRC and Rwanda signed the Genocide Convention.
10. The Vienna Convention language is based on the same language that
interprets the Genocide Convention. Compare Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art.
19(c) (stating that if a "reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty" it may be invalid), with Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ 15, 24 (May
28) ("It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and
purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State
in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in
objecting to the reservation.").
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jurisdictional reservations do not contravene the "object and
purpose" of a treaty, the ICJ's decision will have a strong effect
on the international judicial enforcement of all treaties.
This Comment argues that the ICJ correctly declined to
exercise jurisdiction over Rwanda. Section I outlines the
jurisdictional requirements for the ICJ and describes the
developments in the international law of treaties regarding
reservations. Section II reviews the Court's reasoning in Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo ("Armed Activities").
Section III analyzes the Court's decision in the case and argues
that that the Court's decision was correct. This Comment
concludes that despite the negative effects of declining
jurisdiction over this case, the ICJ correctly held that it may
only exercise jurisdiction when consented to by the parties.
I. THE ICJ'S JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES AND THE
LAW ON RESERVATIONS
This section will first discuss the bases for jurisdiction
under international law, and will then analyze the relevant ICJ
rulings and scholarly discourse on the legality of reservations
leading up to the Armed Activities case.
A. STATE CONSENT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ICJ JURISDICTION
The ICJ is meant to be a voluntary dispute resolution body;
therefore, the central tenet of the ICJ's jurisdictional power is
that it may only exercise jurisdiction over consenting states.1
When world leaders assembled at the San Francisco Convention
in 1945 to create the United Nations ("U.N."), they explicitly
rejected any form of mandatory jurisdiction for the ICJ because
they wanted to leave open the possibility of other pacifistic
measures, such as binding arbitration or bilateral negotiations,
for states to mediate their disputes. 12 If mandatory jurisdiction
was adopted, there was fear that the ICJ would preclude the use
of other dispute resolution procedures. 13 To avoid this outcome,
the ICJ was created as a voluntary option for willing states
11. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT 73 (1962) ("The
International Court receives this power Uurisdiction] only from the consent of the
States concerned that it should so act. Neither the Charter of the United Nations,
nor any general rule of contemporary international law, imposes on States the
obligation to refer their legal disputes to the Court.").
12. Id. at 73-74.
13. Id.
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rather than as a binding authority on international law.
As a result of the ICJ's non-compulsory status, there is "no
general obligation requiring that a dispute be submitted to an
international tribunal."14 The ICJ may only exercise jurisdiction
using one of three different avenues. First, the adverse States
may enter into an agreement, called a compromis, allowing ICJ
jurisdiction over their dispute. 15 Second, Article 36 of the ICJ
statute allows for "compulsory jurisdiction."16 Under Article 36,
a State may choose to subject itself to the ICJ's authority in all
cases where all parties to the dispute have accepted compulsory
jurisdiction. 17 Third, and at issue in Armed Activities, the ICJ
may exercise jurisdiction over parties based on a jurisdictional
clause in a treaty. 8
Each of the preceding bases for jurisdiction requires state
consent. Compromis jurisdiction obviously requires the
approval of both states. Compulsory jurisdiction is also
optional: a state may choose not to be subject to compulsory
jurisdiction, and, even if the state decides to enter into the
compulsory jurisdiction scheme, the state may limit the extent
to which the jurisdiction applies. 9 States may also withdraw
14. Judge Abdul G. Koroma, Assertion of Jurisdiction by the International
Court of Justice, in ASSERTING JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 190 (Patrick Capps et al., eds. 2003).
15. Id.
16. Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is The International Court of
Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 603 (2005).
17. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1060, available at httpJ/www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/
ibasicstatute.htm [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. In full, Article 36(2) states:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of
the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
Id., art. 36(2).
18. Id. art. 36(1) ('The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force."). See also Posner, supra note 16, at
603.
19. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
[Vol. 16:2
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their consent at any time.20 The treaty reservation system
accomplishes the same result for treaty-based jurisdiction. 21 In
short, "[nlo matter which [type of jurisdiction] is at issue, the
Court's jurisdiction depends upon State consent."22
The ICJ, through its case law, has recognized the necessity
of consent from both states in Monetary Gold Removed from
Rome in 1943 and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.23 In both cases,
the ICJ found that it could not rule without the consent of all
states affected by the ruling.
Despite the state consent rule, a state may implicitly agree
to jurisdiction despite an overt rejection of jurisdiction in that
specific case. 24  For example, in 1984, the United States
contested the ICJ's jurisdiction over a dispute with Nicaragua. 25
Despite the United States' objection, the ICJ declared that the
United States had agreed to compulsory jurisdiction and,
therefore, was subject to jurisdiction. 26 Thus, the ICJ may
exercise jurisdiction even in the absence of state consent if the
Court of Justice: How Compulsory Is It?, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 29, 31 (2006). In fact,
only 67 nations and one Security Council nation (the United Kingdom) have agreed
to any compulsory jurisdiction. Id.
20. Aman Mahray McHugh, Resolving International Boundary Disputes in
Africa: A Case for the International Court of Justice, 49 HOW. L.J. 209, 229 (2005).
21. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), 2006 ICJ LEXIS 1, at * 12 (Order of Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icrw/ijudgment/icrw-ijudgment_20060203.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
22. Koroma, supra note 14.
23. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., N. Ir., and
U.S.), 1954 ICJ 19 (June 15); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 ICJ 93
(July 22). Monetary Gold dealt with a dispute between Italy and Albania regarding
the possession of gold taken by the Germans from Rome during the Second World
War. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., N. Ir., and
U.S.), 1954 ICJ 19, 21 (June 15). Italy brought a case to the ICJ to determine the
ownership of the gold. Id. at 22. Albania did not consent to the hearing, and the ICJ
held that without Albania's consent they were unable to rule. Id. at 32. Similarly,
in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Court was asked by the United Kingdom to
adjudicate a dispute with Iran. The Iranians had seized the assets of a British oil
company as they nationalized the oil industry. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v.
Iran), 1952 ICJ 93, 102 (July 22). The ICJ ruled again that it could not exercise
jurisdiction without the consent of Iran. Id. at 103.
24. ROSENNE, supra note 11, at 84.
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1984 ICJ 392 (Nov. 26).
26. The United States contested jurisdiction based on a purported withdrawal
from Article 36 jurisdiction in disputes with Central American countries. Id. at 415.
The ICJ, however, rejected the United States' argument, reading a clause in the
United States' 1946 declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to require a
six-month grace period for any change. Id. at 421.
2007]
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state is party to another agreement that implies jurisdiction.
"Implied consent" through other agreements is especially
important in the context of reservations because, if a reservation
is held invalid, it could potentially subject the affected state to
"implied consent" jurisdiction. 27
B. THE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES OF THE ICJ
If the ICJ decides that there is jurisdiction in a case and
proceeds to make a ruling, its decision binds the parties under
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. 28 Article 94 also provides that if
the losing party refuses to comply, the prevailing party may ask
the Security Council to enforce the judgment. 29 However, the
Security Council has never acted to support an ICJ decision. 30
Similarly, domestic courts generally do not enforce ICJ
decisions.31
The ICJ's decisions are complied with approximately sixty-
eight percent of the time.12 Cases that involve preliminary
objections to jurisdiction and substantive use of force issues
have the lowest compliance rates.33  Very few cases with
preliminary objections or cases involving the use of force even
reach a decision on the merits. Of cases that reach the merits,
in only half of cases with preliminary objections and forty
percent of cases regarding use of force was the ICJ decision
complied with by both parties.34  For example, in Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua,35 the United States failed to comply with a ruling
after it made a preliminary objection. 36 Similarly, in Case
27. See infra Part III.D-E (noting that reservations could, theoretically, be held
invalid if they are contrary to the "object and purpose" of the treaty).
28. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 ("Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party.").
29. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.
30. Tom Ginsburg & Richard A. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An
Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229,
1308 (2004).
31. See generally A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American
Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877 (2000).
32. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 30.
33. Id. at 1313, 1327.
34. Id. at 1331, 1315.
35. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1984 ICJ 392 (Nov. 26).
36. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the
Nicaraguan government accused the United States of engaging in military activities.
[Vol. 16:2
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Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran,'7 Iran refused to comply with an ICJ ruling contrary to
its preliminary objections in a use of force case. 38
C. THE TRADITIONAL RULE DOES NOT ALLOW RESERVATIONS
WITHOUT UNANIMOUS CONSENT
Both the Tehran and Nicaragua cases involved states
claiming jurisdictional reservations. A reservation is a
statement by a signatory state that it does not intend to be
bound by a specific article or part of an article in a treaty to
which it is otherwise a party.3 9 Reservations are extremely
common in large multilateral treaties.40
Prior to 1951, reservations were rare, since reservations
were per se invalid without the consent of every nation that was
party to a treaty.41 The consent rule could be altered by adding
an addendum to the treaty, but the default rule was unanimous
consent.4
2
A competing, and less popular, reservation scheme was the
Pan-American approach, which allowed any nation to make a
reservation to a particular clause, and then each other signatory
could choose individually whether or not to accept the
reservation.43  If another signatory chose not to accept the
reservation, the treaty did not enter into effect between those
two nations. Although the Pan-American approach had the
benefits of being less collective than the unanimous consent
approach, it had the downside of developing a treaty system
that was not uniform--each treaty had many signatories in
Id. at 397. The United States raised a preliminary objection to jurisdiction, which
was overruled by the Court. Id. at 442. Once the Court made its judgment, the
United States refused to comply. Heidi K. Hubbard, Separation of Powers within the
United Nations: A Revised Role for the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 165, 174-75 (1985).
37. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
ICJ 3 (May 24).
38. In United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the United
States brought an action against Iran during the Iranian hostage crisis. Iran made
preliminary objections which were overruled. Id. at 43. The ICJ ruled for the
United States, but Iran did not comply. Hubbard, supra note 36, at 174.
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 607 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
40. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ 15, 32 (May 28).
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different relationships with each other. 44
However, in the era after the Second World War, the
traditional rules of treaty interpretation became infeasible. 45 In
human rights treaties, the amount of state signatories
exploded.46 As a result, it became more difficult for the growing
number of signatory states to reach unanimity on most issues.47
D. THE EROSION OF THE TRADITIONAL RULE ON RESERVATIONS
AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN RULE
The tension between the traditional rule and modern
diplomatic realities culminated in 1951 when the ICJ faced its
first controversy over the ability of nations to make reservations
to a major treaty. In Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide48 the
United Nations asked the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion on
the rule of reservations. 49  Eight countries had issued
reservations, and all eight of the states included reservations to
the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the Genocide Convention.50
The ICJ was faced with the dilemma of encouraging a large
number of sovereign states to join the treaty regime, which
generally meant allowing states to promulgate reservations,
without allowing so many reservations that the integrity of the
treaty was damaged. In the end, the ICJ ruled that a state may
remain a member of the treaty in the face of an objection by
another signatory, so long as "the reservation is compatible with
the object and purpose of the Convention."51
1. The Sovereignty Concern
In its opinion, the ICJ recognized the evolution of treaties
from small agreements between friendly states that could be
44. Id.
45. Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State
Consent, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 533-34 (2002).
46. Id. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention] (140 parties); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (155 parties).
47. Goodman, supra note 45, at 534.
48. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ 15 (May 28).
49. Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 31.
51. Id. at 29.
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interpreted and enforced like contracts to multilateral compacts
that often involve more than one hundred signatories.
5 2
Treaties became a product of a series of majority votes, so
although the adoption of the treaty may be unanimous, each
sovereign nation may find it necessary to make legitimate
reservations. 53
The ICJ, however, rejected the extreme sovereignty
approach which states that national sovereignty mandates a
nation's ability to establish reservations on any part of the
treaty it finds repugnant. 54 The ICJ stated that a free-for-all
reservation policy would damage the integrity of the treaty as
many countries could be signatories but withhold reservations
on all of the most integral parts.55 As a result, the ICJ ruled
that only reservations that were compatible with the "object and
purpose" of the treaty would be valid.
56
2. The Breadth Concern
The second problem that the ICJ struggled with was
breadth-the concern that a restrictive reservation policy would
deter many countries from joining the treaty. The ICJ realized
that the drafters of the Genocide Convention desired that "as
many States as possible should participate."57 The ICJ argued
that without the ability to promulgate reservations, many states
that would have joined the treaty would feel constrained and
refuse to sign.58
The inability to make reservations is a concern for states
that do not want to be bound by a particular term or wish to
52. Id. at 21 ("as regards the Genocide Convention, it is proper to refer to a
variety of circumstances which would lead to a more flexible application of this
[contract] principle.").
53. Id. at 22 ("It must also be pointed out that although the Genocide
Convention was finally approved unanimously, it is nevertheless the result of a
series of majority votes. The majority principle, while facilitating the conclusion of
multilateral conventions, may also make it necessary for certain States to make
reservations.").
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. (noting that the drafters could not "have intended to sacrifice the very
object of the Convention in favour of a vain desire to secure as many participants as
possible.").
56. Id. at 43.
57. Id. at 24.
58. Swaine, supra note 41, at 332. A modern day example of a restriction on
reservations causing a loss of breadth is the Rome Convention, where the United
States was unwilling to join the International Criminal Court without reservations.
Id. at 329.
20071
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
follow their own interpretation of a term.59 Scholars contend
that the breadth concern is particularly important in the human
rights context because human rights treaties are supposed to be
a definitive statement of international law and an increase in
signatories makes it more likely that the treaty will become
normative international law. 60 The accumulation of signatories
is important because the general adherence to the newly created
normative law assists the ICJ's goal of strengthening the
"authority of the moral and humanitarian principles" embodied
in the treaty.61
3. The Integrity Concern
In addition to the concern about breadth, the ICJ struggled
with upholding the integrity of the treaty regime. Scholars
contended that if the ICJ created a regime that allowed too
many states to have reservations, the treaties would have many
members but lose all meaning.62 In short, the ICJ had "to
choose between either getting as many States as possible to
ratify the treaty, or to prefer the idea that the treaty constitutes
a coherent and balanced package which does not allow any
interference." 63
Scholars argue that as each state demands more
reservations, that state becomes less desirable to the other
signatories on the treaty.64  Excessive reservations "impair
treaty integrity, uniformity, and consistency among members,
and in the aggregate undermine (rather than enhance) any
claim to status as customary international law."65 Especially in
the genocide and human rights context, the primary goal of the
treaties is to set an international baseline for the handling of
human rights issues. 66 Professor Ryan Goodman argues that,
59. Palitha T.B. Kohona, Reservations: Discussion of Recent Developments in
the Practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as Depositary of
Multilateral Treaties, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 417 (2005).
60. Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 649 (1990).
61. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ 15, 24 (May 28).
62. Jan Klabbers, On Human Rights Treaties, Contractual Conceptions and
Reservations, in RESERVATIONS TO HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE VIENNA
CONVENTION REGIME 149, 155 (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004).
63. Id.
64. See Swaine, supra note 41, at 330; Goodman, supra note 45, at 534.
65. Swaine, supra note 41, at 330 (citation omitted).
66. Goodman, supra note 45, at 534.
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"Allowing states to join the treaty with incompatible
reservations would repudiate or downgrade its normative, or
standard-setting, base."67 In short, scholars are concerned that
excessive reservations may "ruin" a treaty.68
The ICJ attempted to allay the integrity concern by stating
that "none of the contracting parties is entitled to frustrate or
impair, by means of unilateral decisions or particular
agreements, the purpose and raison d'etre of the convention."69
The ICJ hoped that its policy limiting reservations to those that
do not materially alter the treaty would satisfy the competing
goals of sovereignty, breadth, and integrity.
4. The Imperfect Compromise
The ICJ's 1951 compromise, however, invites almost as
many problems as it resolves. Reservations are becoming
increasingly common in treaties and their frequent inclusion
has caused a great deal of scholarly concern. 70 Critics argue
that the compromise approach is unfair because it allows those
states who were "losers" in the negotiation about what should go
in the treaty to withhold their signature from the parts that
they disagreed with.71 The ICJ has noted the difficulty of
determining exactly what the "object and purpose" of the treaty
is. 72 Therefore, rather than adopting a bright line test, the ICJ
determines whether or not a reservation contravenes the "object
and purpose" of a treaty on a case-by-case basis.73 As a result,
the framework that Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo entered into was a flexible one.
67. Id.
68. Klabbers, supra note 62, at 151 (quoting Liesbeth Lijnzaad, RESERVATIONS
TO UN-HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY AND RUIN? (1994)).
69. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ 15, 21 (May 28).
70. Klabbers, supra note 62, at 151.
71. Id. at 163.
72. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ 15, 41-44 (May 28) (dissenting
opinion).
73. Id. at 26 ("The appraisal of a reservation and the effect of objections that
might be made to it depend upon the particular circumstances of each individual
case.").
20071
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II. ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE
CONGO
On May 28, 2002, the DRC brought an action against
Rwanda in the ICJ claiming "'massive, serious and flagrant
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian
law' alleged to have been committed 'in breach of the
'International Bill of Human Rights', other relevant
international instruments and mandatory resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council" perpetrated by Rwanda. 74
Most importantly for this Comment, the DRC claimed that "by
killing, massacring, raping, throat-cutting, and crucifying,
Rwanda is guilty of genocide against more than 3,500,000
Congolese, including the victims of the recent massacres in the
city of Kisangani, and has violated the sacred right to life
provided for in . . . the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."75
Rwanda responded to the DRC's contentions with only a
blanket statement that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over
the DRC's claims because it made a reservation to Article IX of
the Convention, which confers jurisdiction over disputes to the
ICJ 76 The DRC responded by relying on the compromissory
clause 77 in the Genocide Convention as the basis for jurisdiction
at the ICJ.78 The DRC also relied on procedural mechanisms 79
74. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), 2006 ICJ LEXIS 1, at *12 (Order of Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/icrw/ijudgment/icrw-ijudgment 20060203.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2007). Specifically, the DRC argued that Rwanda violated the
U.N. Charter and Charter of the Organization of African Unity by committing
human rights violations. Id. at *20. The DRC also alleged that Rwanda violated the
United Nations Charter, the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and the Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
by shooting down a civilian airliner. Id.
75. Id. at *20.
76. Id. at *21.
77. A compromissory clause is a clause in a treaty that gives dispute resolution
authority to the ICJ See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 46, art. IX, at 282
("Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation,
application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in
article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute.")
78. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, at *25.
79. Id. at *26. Procedurally, the DRC relied on forum prorogatum as well as
the ICJ's decision not to remove the case from the list in support of jurisdiction.
Forum prorogatum is an argument that one state may accept jurisdiction even when
[Vol. 16:2
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as well as factual arguments as to whether or not Rwanda had
actually withdrawn its jurisdictional reservation to the
Genocide Convention.80 The ICJ eventually rejected all of the
DRC's asserted bases for jurisdiction and dismissed the case.8'
Specifically, the Court rejected the DRC's argument that
Rwanda's reservation was incompatible with the "object and
purpose" of the Genocide Convention because it excluded
Rwanda from "any mechanism for the monitoring and
prosecution of Genocide."82  Rwanda responded that the
reservation could not be contrary to the "object and purpose" of
the treaty because the jurisdictional reservation was procedural
in nature, and thereby could not be contrary to the substantive
"object and purpose" of the treaty. Rwanda also argued that its
reservation could not be contrary to the aims of the Convention
since sixteen other states held the same reservation,8 3 and
because the DRC and the vast majority of the 133 signatory
countries did not object to the reservation.8 4
The Court agreed with Rwanda. The ICJ found that it had
previously ruled that reservations were compatible with the
Genocide Convention, and that procedural reservations which
only eliminated one method of adjudicating breaches of the
treaty were not contrary to the "object and purpose" of the
treaty.85 The Court, therefore, rejected the DRC's claim of
jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention and dismissed the
case.
86
jurisdiction is not proper. The DRC argued that Rwanda, by submitting pleadings,
had accepted jurisdiction under forum prorogatum. Id. The Court, however, found
that Rwanda had not expressed "an unequivocal indication" to accept the
jurisdiction of the Court, and denied the forum prorogatum argument. Id. at *29.
The DRC further argued that the Court had impliedly authorized jurisdiction by
failing to remove the case from the List in a previous order. However, the Court
rejected that argument as well, stating that the mere fact that the Court had not
found a "manifest lack of jurisdiction" did not mean that there was no jurisdiction.
Id. at *33.
80. Id. at *36. The factual arguments revolved around whether or not Rwanda
had withdrawn its reservation. Id.
81. Id. at *110.
82. Id. at *55.
83. The other states holding reservations to Article IX of the Convention are
Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia, Morocco, the
Philippines, Rwanda, Singapore, Spain, the United States of America, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. See List of Genocide Convention Signatories,
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treatylgen.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
84. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo at * 110.
85. Id. at *62.
86. Id. at *63. Justice Koroma dissented, arguing that the Court's decision
runs contrary to the Genocide Convention's "object and purpose" because it refused
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III. THE ARMED ACTIVITIES RULING UPHELD A
DESIRABLE TREATY RESERVATIONS SYSTEM AND
MAINTAINED THE COURT'S LEGITIMACY
Although the ICJ's decision in Armed Activities has been
met with a great deal of disapproval, the criticisms are
unfounded. Critics claim that the Court ignored the
"punishment" aspect of the Convention and that by doing so the
Court allowed nations to avoid their responsibilities under the
Convention.8 7 However, critics of the Court's decision ignore the
pragmatic aspects of the resolution, which spared not only the
goal of the treaty but the Court's own legitimacy.88 The Court
rightfully maintained that the goal of the treaty was to ascribe
international norms by maintaining a wide breadth of
membership.8 9 Furthermore, the ICJ made the correct decision
because, on a purely jurisdictional level, the Court may not
accept jurisdiction in the absence of consent of the parties.90
Lastly, even if the Court had struck down the reservation and
exercised jurisdiction, its ruling would have likely been ignored,
damaging the Court's legitimacy in the future.91
to hold Rwanda to account for its breach, thereby annulling the "punishment"
section of the Convention. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 ICJ LEXIS 4, at *6 (Order of Feb. 3, 2006) (Koroma, J.,
dissenting) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icrw/ijudgment/
icrwijudgment_20060203_dissentingopinionkoroma.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2007). He continued, arguing that human rights treaties were not contractual
treaties that required consent and reciprocity between states, rather, such treaties
are meant to protect individuals. Id. at *10. However, Justice Koroma was in the
extreme minority, with the final vote for dismissal being 15-2. Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 ICJ LEXIS 1, at *110
(Order of Feb. 3, 2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.orgicjwww/idocket/icrw/
ijudgment/icrwijudgment_20060203.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
87. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), 2006 ICJ LEXIS 4, at *7 (Order of Feb. 3, 2006) (Koroma, J., dissenting)
available at http://www.icj-cij.orgicjwww/idocket/icrw/ijudgmenticrw-ijudgment-
20060203_- dissenting-opinion koroma.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); Alexander
Orakhelashvili, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Judgment of 3 February 2006, 55 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 753 (2006).
88. See infra Part III.A-E.
89. See infra Part III.A.
90. See infra Part III.B.
91. See infra Part III.C-E.
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A. THE COURT'S DECISION UPHELD THE "OBJECT AND PURPOSE"
OF THE TREATY BY GUARANTEEING WIDER PARTICIPATION
The Court's decision to allow reservations upheld the "object
and purpose" of the Convention by ensuring that the largest
number of states possible are party to the treaty, hence
increasing the chance that the treaty's precepts become
normative international law. Critics of the Court's decision
merely focus on the words "punishment and prevention" in the
title of the treaty, and claim that allowing reservations
jeopardizes that goal.92 However, critics ignore the devastating
effects the reduction in breadth would have on the punishment
and prevention goals of the treaty. The Convention, along with
all human rights treaties, benefits from having a large amount
of treaty signatories. Human rights treaties, including the
Convention, are created in order to build the "credibility and the
capacity to become normative under customary law even for
nonsignatory states."93 The Genocide Convention preamble
states clearly that "international co-operation is required."94 In
fact, the ICJ itself recognized that one of the goals of the
Genocide Convention was to "maximize state participation."
95
Any restriction on the right to reservations will result in a
reduction in the amount of state signatories to the Convention
because states will be unsure how the terms in the Convention
will be defined by the ICJ.96 Human rights conventions, like the
Genocide Convention, involve a significant amount of burdens
with few tangible benefits (compared with a commercial
treaty).97  Furthermore, compared to commercial treaties,
human rights treaties tend to have a more sweeping scope and
include terms that may be open to interpretation. 98  For
instance, the Genocide Convention states that "complicity in
92. Id. See also Genocide Convention, supra note 46, art. IX, at 282.
93. Cook, supra note 60, at 649.
94. Genocide Convention, supra note 46, pmbl., at 278.
95. Jennifer Riddle, Note, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW's
Reservation Regime Under Article 28 And The Effectiveness Of The Reporting
Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 605, 609 (2002); see Reservations to the
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 ICJ 15 (May 28).
96. Kohona, supra note 59, at 417 (asserting that without the power of
reservation some states are barred by their own "domestic legal and political
considerations" from signing a treaty).
97. Cook, supra note 60, at 650.
98. Id.
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genocide" is forbidden. 99 Terms such as "complicity," which are
open to interpretation, will drive away states that are worried
about their application unless they are permitted to make
reservations. 10 0 Everyone may agree that a certain thing, such
as "genocide," is bad, but not every state has the same definition
of the term in mind when signing the treaty.10 1 Even though the
reservation may take the form of a definitional reservation
(where the state reserves its participation to a particular
definition), 10 2 a state may choose to withhold jurisdiction as well
to ensure that a foreign or international tribunal is not defining
the terms in a way the signatory state did not intend. Any
change in reservations policy that requires states to submit to
an international tribunal would reduce state participation. 10 3
Similarly, eliminating jurisdictional reservations would
have a negative effect on treaty participation because of
domestic political issues in signatory states. Many signatory
states struggle with domestic legal and political issues when
deciding whether to sign a multilateral treaty.10 4 Those states
rely on reservations in order to sign treaties that may be
agreeable in most respects but impermissible in others. 10 5
Reservations allow them to accede to the agreeable parts of the
treaty while not acceding to the unacceptable provisions. 10 6
Many countries do not accept ICJ jurisdiction because of
concerns that they may not get a fair trial in front of the
international tribunal. 107 Those states would likely withdraw
from treaties with jurisdictional provisions, including the
Genocide Convention, if the ICJ overruled Rwanda's
reservation.108
99. Genocide Convention, supra note 46, art. III(e), at 280.
100. Cook, supra note 60, at 650.
101. Klabbers, supra note 62, at 155.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Kohona, supra note 59, at 417.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. For example, the USSR never agreed to ICJ jurisdiction because of the lack
of communist bloc judges. Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law and the
Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (2006).
108. A poignant example of a country refusing to join a treaty because of the
lack of reservations is the United States' decision not to join the International
Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute, which created the ICC, does not allow any
reservations to jurisdiction. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
art. 120, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998). As a result, the United States
refused to become a signatory to the ICC. Whereas, if reservations had been
allowed, the United States may have considered joining the treaty. Swaine, supra
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Therefore, the major "object and purpose" of the
Convention-to develop international cooperation against
genocide-would have been significantly constrained by an ICJ
ruling of compulsory jurisdiction. As stated above, breadth is
extremely important to human rights treaties, because as more
states become signatories the treaty develops into a stronger
statement of international opinion. 109 If only a few countries are
signatories to a human rights treaty, the statement of
international opinion is much less persuasive, and therefore it is
unlikely the treaty's precepts will become normative
international law.110 The Genocide Convention explicitly relies
on international cooperation to reach its ends.' If the ICJ had
ruled in favor of the DRC, and required Rwanda to submit to
jurisdiction, it is likely that the number of signatories to the
treaty would decline, and the persuasive value of the treaty in
international law would be lessened.
Furthermore, allowing jurisdictional reservations, as the
ICJ did in Armed Activities, benefits the overall treaty structure
by allowing for a greater breadth of state signatories. If there
are a large number of signatories to the treaty, there is at least
a possibility that those signatories will follow the treaty in order
to be considered a reliable partner in international treaty
negotiations. 112  Certainly, the signatory states with
reservations will not comply as fully under the treaty as those
without reservations. However, those states that would not
become signatories if ICJ jurisdiction were mandatory may now
become signatories and comply at least partially."13
Although the benefits of breadth are well defined, critics
argue that with an increase in reservations the integrity and
depth of a treaty may suffer.1 4 Parties to commercial treaties
may be subject to economic consequences for making certain
reservations. 1 5  Human rights treaties do not have such
note 41, at 328-329. Although the United States may have been only a partial
participant, the ICC example shows the benefit of breadth over integrity. The
United States is a vital signatory to any treaty and the loss of the United States as
even a partial signatory jeopardizes the ICC's chances for success. Randall
Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 809, 899 (2005).
109. Cook, supra note 60, at 649-50.
110. Id.
111. Genocide Convention, supra note 46, pmbl., at 278.
112. Cook, supra note 60, at 649-650.
113. Id.
114. Swaine, supra note 41, at 330.
115. Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and Article
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consequences and are, therefore, likely targets for abuse of
reservations. 116  Reservations also damage the "integrity,
uniformity, and consistency" of the treaty, as each signatory has
agreed to a slightly different version of the same treaty."17
Additionally, the normative power of the treaty, one of the major
benefits of breadth, is reduced as more states make reservations
to the substantive portions of the treaty.118 Furthermore, treaty
integrity may be damaged by allowing reservations to
jurisdiction because signatories will not be subject to any
judicial enforcement if they breach the treaty.119
Despite the criticism, the damage to treaty integrity by
procedural reservations is not as great as it appears. Although
the dilution of the treaty is a concern, if reservations were
denied after the accession of the state to the treaty, it would
likely have deleterious effects on the enforcement of the treaty
as a whole, as many states would decide not to perform the
obligations under the treaty that they reserved regardless of
whether the reservation was considered valid. 20 The treaty
would then lack integrity because the inconsistency would still
exist-except states' reservations would be implicit rather than
explicit.
In addition, by declining to allow reservations, the treaty
risks the loss of financial and moral support from states that
disagree.' 2' When the Human Rights Committee attempted to
reduce the right to make reservations from the Human Rights
Conventions, the United States threatened to withdraw
financial support for human rights enforcement measures. 22
Therefore, it is quite likely that a treaty's integrity could be
damaged by withdrawal of support and financial resources from
key players should jurisdictional reservations be overruled.
Therefore, despite the fact that an emphasis on breadth
21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 21 (2003).
116. Id.
117. Swaine, supra note 41, at 330.
118. Goodman, supra note 45, at 534.
119. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), 2006 ICJ LEXIS 4, at *6 (Order of Feb. 3, 2006) (Koroma, J., dissenting)
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icrw/ijudgmentlicrw-ijudgment_
20060203_dissenting_ opinion-koroma.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
120. Laurence R. Helfer, Response: Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk,
and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 367, 380 (2006).
121. Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 277, 318 (1999).
122. Id. In fact, both houses of Congress passed a law withdrawing financial
support, and only a veto from President Clinton prevented the threat. Id. at 319.
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may lead to signatory states not following all of the tenets of a
treaty, the benefits of breadth outweigh the costs of integrity. 123
A focus on integrity risks financial and moral support from key
nations and jeopardizes the overall integrity of the treaty by
making states' reservations implicit rather than explicit. The
ICJ decision will lead to a larger amount of signatories than if
the jurisdictional reservation had been denied. The larger
amount of signatories increases the likelihood that the tenets of
the Genocide Convention will become normative international
law. Rwanda may have violated the Convention, but the
damage of one or two states that violate the Convention and
cannot be held to account is outweighed by the potential of
many more states following the Convention and the resulting
changes in normative international law. The ICJ made the
correct decision that the jurisdictional reservations are within
the "object and purpose" of the Convention.
B. THE ICJ DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE BINDING
RULINGS IN THE ABSENCE OF RWANDA'S CONSENT.
Even if the ICJ wished to strike down Rwanda's reservation
it plainly lacks the jurisdiction to do so. The ICJ relies on state
consent for its jurisdiction over disputes. 124 Similarly, treaty
provisions are only binding on those states that voluntarily
agree to them. 125 Therefore, the ICJ, without Rwanda's consent,
cannot legally exercise jurisdiction or alter treaty commitments.
It is well established that the ICJ may only exercise
jurisdiction with the consent of the state parties. 126 States
"jealously guard their sovereignty," and, therefore, the ICJ must
only exercise jurisdiction judiciously. 27 The ICJ may only
adjudicate if the parties have accepted jurisdiction either
through compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, through a treaty
obligation, or through compromis (special agreement)
jurisdiction. 128 It is undisputed that Rwanda has not explicitly
accepted jurisdiction through either compulsory jurisdiction or a
compromis, and Rwanda's signature on the Genocide
123. Cook, supra note 60, at 649-50.
124. Rosenne, supra note 11.
125. Baylis, supra note 121, at 287.
126. Rosenne, supra note 11.
127. Brandi J. Pummell, The Timor Gap: Who Decides Who Is In Control?, 26
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 655, 686 (1998).
128. Koroma, supra note 14.
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Convention included a reservation of jurisdiction. Therefore,
Rwanda has not consented to ICJ Jurisdiction and jurisdiction
is not proper.
The precept that the ICJ requires consent is well
established in ICJ case law.129 In Case of the Monetary Gold
Removed from Rome in 1943,130 the Court declined to exercise
jurisdiction because the "very subject-matter" of the dispute
involved Albania, which had not consented. The Court held that
to exercise jurisdiction without consent "would run counter to a
well-established principle of international law embodied in the
Court's Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise
jurisdiction over a State with its consent."131 In Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company,3 2 the Court similarly held that "the jurisdiction of
the Court to deal with and decide a case on the merits depends
on the will of the Parties. Unless the Parties have conferred
jurisdiction on the Court the Court lacks such
jurisdiction."133
Therefore, based on tradition, previous cases, and the
Statute of the ICJ, the Court is limited to exercising jurisdiction
in cases where the parties have consented to jurisdiction. As
Rwanda had not consented to jurisdiction, the Court made the
proper decision to not exercise jurisdiction even if the
reservation was contrary to the "object and purpose" of the
Genocide Convention.
Similarly, state signatories may only be bound by treaty
provisions to which they have agreed. 134 Treaties are
considered in the same light as contract law: negotiation and
consent are required. 135  The ICJ recognized this in the
Reservations case when it stated that "[i]t is well established
that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its
129. It is important to note that the ICJ's case law is not binding precedent. The
founders of the ICJ wanted to allow the new institution room to develop without
allowing third party observers to critique its decisions based on previous ones. The
ICJ does, however, frequently use reasoning and outcomes in past decisions to make
decisions in present matters, although it has no obligation to. H. Vern Clemons,
Comment, The Ethos of the International Court of Justice is Dependent Upon the
Statutory Authority Attributed to its Rhetoric: A Metadiscourse, 20 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1479, 1499 (1997).
130. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K, N. Ir., and
U.S.), 1954 ICJ 19 (June 15).
131. Id. at 32.
132. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K v. Iran), 1952 ICJ 93 (July 22).
133. Id. at 103.
134. Id. at 288.




Therefore, although the DRC argues that Rwanda has
acceded to "implied consent" jurisdiction by signing the treaty,
jurisdiction is not valid under treaty laws because it would
require Rwanda to submit to jurisdiction after making a valid
reservation, thereby changing the conditions on which Rwanda
signed the Convention.137  Indeed, "[r]atification with
reservations could only be regarded as implied consent to sever
the reservations if states parties were aware before ratifying
that severance was a possibility."138 As sixteen other nations
have already made the same reservation to this treaty, it is
clear that Rwanda could not have considered severance of its
jurisdictional reservation to be a possibility, and therefore, an
ICJ decision severing that reservation would be contrary to
international legal principles.
The ICJ might have an argument for severing the
reservation if the reservation was so flagrant "as to constitute
bad faith." 139 That is clearly not the case here because other
states have made reservations to the Convention and it is
unlikely that such reservations were made in bad faith.
Additionally, neither party contends that Rwanda actually
intended to commit genocide when it ratified the treaty in 1975
with the reservation and thereby ratified the treaty in bad faith.
As a result, it cannot be "implied" from Rwanda's position as a
signatory on the treaty that they consented to jurisdiction. By
making a reservation, Rwanda withdrew both express and
implied consent to ICJ jurisdiction and as a result, the ICJ
cannot legally exercise jurisdiction over it.
C. THE ICJ HAS No ENFORCEMENT MEASURES AND ANY
RULING WITHOUT STATE CONSENT IS UNLIKELY To BE
FOLLOWED
The consent element is important because the ICJ's ability
to enforce its own judgments in the absence of voluntary state
compliance is extremely limited. Article 94 of the Charter of the
U.N. specifically addresses the effect of ICJ judgments, with the
mere request that each state "undertak[e] to comply with the
136. Reservations to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ 15, 21 (May 28).
137. Baylis, supra note 121, at 326.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 327.
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decision." If one party does not comply, recourse is left to the
Security Council to enforce compliance. 140 The Security Council
has never done sO.'41 Domestic courts generally refuse to
enforce ICJ judgments. 142 As a result, there is a low level of
compliance, especially with use of force cases.143 It is likely that,
even had the ICJ had ruled in the DRC's favor and exercised
jurisdiction, Rwanda would have ignored the ICJ's decision
because the ICJ lacks efficient enforcement mechanisms.
Although ICJ decisions are binding on the parties to the
dispute, that authority comes from the sheer force of persuasive
reasoning by the ICJ and the consent of the parties, not from
any particular enforcement method. 44 The only recourse for the
prevailing party to enforce the judgment is to go to the Security
Council under Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. 145 However, the
Security Council is not obliged to actually enforce the judgment;
it is merely "permitted to do so, if it thinks the step
necessary."146 Furthermore, the Security Council can take that
step with any action that it wishes, even if it means not
enforcing the judgment in full.147  Therefore, the grant of
authority to the Security Council to enforce judgments is a
"weak formulation" that is optional and feeble. 148 Requests to
the Security Council for enforcement are sporadic occurrences at
best.149 They have never been enforced. 50 The Security Council
appeal procedure, although potentially useful in principle, is
anemic to nonexistent in practice, leaving ICJ decisions
unenforceable through those means. 151
Similarly, domestic courts have declined to apply ICJ
decisions as binding precedent. Article 94 does not contemplate
domestic enforcement of ICJ rulings, and therefore implies that
the Security Council should be the only method of
enforcement. 52 In the United States, there are numerous
140. U.N. Charter, art. 94.
141. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 30, at 1308.
142. See generally Weisburd, supra note 31.
143. The historic compliance rate has been calculated at sixty-eight percent for
all cases, and lower for use of force cases. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 30.
144. Clemons, supra note 129, at 1497-98.
145. U.N. Charter art. 94.
146. Weisburd, supra note 31, at 883.
147. Id.




152. Weisburd, supra note 31, at 883.
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examples of courts, including the Supreme Court, ignoring ICJ
decisions. 153 As a result of the lack of both international and
domestic enforcement, "the norm adopted by the ICJ may be
ignored without judicial consequence."1 5 4
Despite the lack of judicial enforcement methods, some
commentators argue that the presence of international pressure
will compel adherence to the ICJ's rulings. Because a failure to
comply with an ICJ ruling would make the state involved in
"illegal" activity, there are substantial "political costs" involved
in an action of non-adherence. 15 5  ICJ decisions are
internationally reported and publicized "thereby causing
noncompliance to carry with it significant risks of public
disapprobrium as well as potential reprisals or other
enforcement actions."156
However, it is unlikely that these world pressures are
sufficient to enforce most ICJ decisions. The lack of ICJ
enforcement methods, both internationally and domestically,
prevents ICJ rulings from having any truly binding effect in lieu
of the parties' consent. Many nations have little to no incentive
to be considered a reliable treaty partner and have little regard
for international opinions due to an already tarnished
reputation, lack of international stature, or political and
economic independence. 157 Furthermore, even if the nation is
concerned about the damage to its international opinion, it may
balance the costs and benefits and decide that it is still in its
best interest to breach. 58 As a result, international pressure is
unlikely to overcome the incentive of states to breach treaties.
Therefore, even if the ICJ were to ignore international
precedent and rules by extending jurisdiction over Rwanda for
violating the "object and purpose" of the Genocide Convention, it
would have no real leverage to enforce the ruling. Due to the
lack of enforcement powers for the ICJ, Rwanda would have
little to no incentive to actually follow an ICJ ruling should the
ICJ assert jurisdiction. The ICJ has no enforcement
mechanisms to compel Rwanda to comply and an appeal from
153. Id. at 882. See also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
154. Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How
NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REv. 51, 75 (2004).
155. John E. Noyes, The Functions of Compromissory Clauses in U.S. Treaties,
34 VA. J. INT'L L. 831, 875 (1994).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 877.
158. Id.
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the DRC to the Security Council would likely fall on deaf ears,
as has every appeal in the past. Although international
pressure may have some effect on Rwanda, as a third world
country with an unstable political system and a history of civil
war and genocide, it is unlikely that Rwanda will be particularly
swayed by international pressure-especially considering that it
has previously refused to withdraw from the DRC despite
international pressure.
D. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT RWANDA WOULD FOLLOW THE RULING
The contention that Rwanda would not have followed the
ruling is buttressed by many examples of other states that have
either refused to appear before the ICJ for hearings or not
followed ICJ rulings in the past. The Court's struggles to assert
jurisdiction in both "implied consent" jurisdiction and use of
force cases bode poorly for the Court's ability to assert and
enforce jurisdiction in Armed Activities. Absent consent, "the
result could only be to force substantive rules on States
reluctant to accept them, and that is rarely a good idea."159 By
one estimate, only sixty-eight percent of ICJ decisions have been
complied with throughout history.160
The Court has had difficulty enforcing jurisdiction in
"implied consent" cases where the losing party has contested
jurisdiction. For example, in Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua the ICJ
asserted jurisdiction over the United States despite the fact that
the United States openly disputed jurisdiction by finding that
the United States' reservation was not sufficient to avoid
jurisdiction. 161 Once the United States lost its preliminary
objection to jurisdiction, it rejected the ICJ's determination of
"implied consent" jurisdiction by not appearing at the
hearings. 162 The United States then refused to follow the
decision of the Court once it was issued. 63 The result of the
Nicaragua case was nothing short of a "fiasco." 64
Furthermore, the ICJ has had little luck asserting
159. Klabbers, supra note 62, at 153.
160. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 30.
161. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1984 ICJ 392 (Nov. 26).
162. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Book Review: The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1993).
163. Hubbard, supra note 36, at 174-175.
164. Posner and Yoo, supra note 107, at 9.
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jurisdiction in use of force cases. In Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 161 for example,
the United States took Iran to the ICJ to secure the release of
United States diplomatic hostages in Iran. Iran did not accept
ICJ jurisdiction, did not appear, and did not release the
hostages. 166 The United States did not even trust the ICJ
enough to rely on its judgment: the United States attempted to
free the hostages by military action during the ICJ
deliberations. 167
The ICJ has even had difficulties compelling states to
appear in use of force cases. Frequently, parties in use of force
cases that dispute jurisdiction either make a preliminary
objection to jurisdiction and then do not appear (as in the
Nicaragua case), or just do not appear altogether (as in the Iran
case). 168  Use of force cases involve national security, an
important aspect of national sovereignty. In short, as one
scholar argues, "[a] force case involves a serious threat to
national security and even survival, as well as to image and
prestige. No state would think it in its best interest to entrust
security or survival completely to a third-party adjudicator
composed of judges from other states."1 69
Furthermore, the problem with use of force cases is that, in
most cases, "the point of seeking or desiring a legal solution has
passed."170 The state that is engaging in the use of force has
already enacted its own dispute resolution system-use of
force. 171 Therefore, the opportunity for the ICJ to receive the
consent necessary to obtain respect for its decision has already
passed. It is unlikely that increasing the amount of compulsory
jurisdiction by waiving jurisdictional reservations would solve
this problem. 172 As a result, it is unsurprising that the ICJ has
been not been able to gain state compliance in use of force cases.
One study found that in the twenty-three use of force cases since
the ICJ's inception, only two rulings have been followed. 173 In
fact, "[d]isputes involving ... a history of armed conflict received
165. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
ICJ 3 (May 24).
166. Hubbard, supra note 34, at 174.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 178.
169. Id. at 186.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 186-87
173. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 30, at 1327.
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the lowest level of compliance" of any kind of dispute. 174
As for "implied consent" jurisdiction, or more broadly, any
kind of contested jurisdiction case, the ICJ has had little success
convincing states to comply with its rulings. Tom Ginsburg and
Richard McAdams conducted a study that found that the most
statistically significant indicator of compliance was lack of
preliminary objections. 175 Therefore, the Court is more likely to
successfully adjudicate a dispute and receive compliance from
willing states than from reluctant states.
Throughout its history, the ICJ has been unable to resolve
cases involving "implied consent" jurisdiction, use of force
issues, and preliminary objections: therefore, it is unlikely that
the ICJ will achieve compliance here. In Armed Activities, had
the ICJ ruled on the case, it would have been asserting "implied
consent" jurisdiction over preliminary objections on a use of
force issue. In short, all of the elements of this case point to the
fact that even if the Court was to assert jurisdiction, Rwanda
would likely not appear before the tribunal and would not
adhere to the ICJ's decision.
E. THE ICJ'S DECISION PRESERVES ITS INTEGRITY AND
DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY FOR OTHER CASES
Despite the fact that the ICJ has been notoriously
ineffective at solving use of force cases, the ICJ still plays an
important role in dispute resolution, a role that is jeopardized if
the ICJ overreaches its bounds and damages its authority by
frequently being rebuked by nonconsenting states. By ruling for
the DRC, the ICJ would be setting the precedent that
jurisdictional reservations are void. This would open up the
possibility of a large number of nonconsenting states becoming
subject to ICJ jurisdiction, only to ignore the ICJ's rulings. A
large volume of ineffectual ICJ rulings could damage the court's
reputation and weaken its ability to successfully adjudicate
cases before willing parties.176
174. Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International
Court of Justice since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 457 (2004).
175. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 30, at 1313.
176. Additionally, the ICJ may lose its symbolic position in world affairs. The
ICJ serves a symbolic role as "an important symbol of global yearning for the
application of the rule of law in addressing transnational conflict." Sean D. Murphy,
Amplifying the World Court's Jurisdiction Through Counter-Claims and Third-party
Intervention, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 5, 28 (2000). The ICJ continues to be a
beacon of light for the hope that states can work together in "a new, more civilized
[Vol. 16:2
ALLOWING GENOCIDE?
The ICJ plays an important role in the international
dispute resolution framework as a consent-based advisor,
arbitrator, and adjudicator of world disputes. It is not disputed
that states voluntarily comply with the vast majority of ICJ
decisions in consensual situations. 1 7 If the ICJ were to expand
its jurisdiction, it would become increasingly marginalized and
ignored by the world community, jeopardizing its vital
participation in world dispute resolution. 178 It would lose its
ability to adjudicate disputes between willing parties by
creating a "general disdain for and disbelief in the effectiveness
of those processes."1 79 Furthermore, increased participation in
use of force, hostile, nonconsensual cases will enlarge the
perception of the ICJ as an unfriendly adjudicator, rather than
as a "consent-based ... advisor and arbitrator."80
The ICJ made the correct decision in Armed Activities
because a precedent placing unwilling states under ICJ
jurisdiction would merely increase the amount of noncompliance
with ICJ decisions. As a result, the Court would have lost a
significant amount of prestige and would have jeopardized its
ability to successfully function. It is important that the Court
recognize its position as a consent-based advisor and arbitrator
that provides dispute resolution to disputing states willing to
recognize it as authoritative. The ICJ must be careful not to
assert its authority on unwilling parties by exercising
jurisdiction over their objections. In Armed Activities, the ICJ
recognized its role and opted not to attempt to extend
jurisdiction into areas that may harm its legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
The ICJ made the correct decision in the Armed Activities
case. First, the Genocide Convention benefits from having as
many countries as possible subscribe to its general tenets. The
larger the number of states party to the Convention, the greater
the chance that the Convention will be considered normative
international law. It also increases the chances that signatory
means of conducting world affairs." Id.
177. Paulson, supra note 174. For instance, the court assisted in getting Libya
to pull troops out of Northern Chad, and ameliorating actions between Nigeria and
Cameroon. Murphy, supra note 176.
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nations will follow the provisions to which they have agreed. A
ruling that jurisdictional reservations are void and severed, and
that states are now bound to a provision of the treaty they never
signed, will lead to withdrawals from the treaty, inconsistent
enforcement, and damage to the treaty's overall goals. Although
it seems counterintuitive that the "object and purpose" of the
Convention may be served by allowing states to avoid
jurisdiction should they violate it, the benefits of having a great
number of signatories outweigh the costs of having one or two
nations breach the treaty without consequences.
Furthermore, even if the Court held Rwanda's jurisdictional
reservation void, it is unlikely that it would be enforceable. The
Court only has jurisdiction over those countries that consent to
jurisdiction, and Rwanda clearly has not consented to
jurisdiction in this case (and is, in fact, disputing it). Therefore,
on a purely legal basis, the Court had no choice but to rule
against the DRC. If the Court was to override Rwanda and find
that it had consented by signing the treaty, it is unlikely that
Rwanda would comply. Rather, Rwanda would just ignore the
Court's order and damage the Court's legitimacy, as the Court
has no practical enforcement powers.
Contrary to popular belief in major powers like the United
States, the Court's legitimacy is very important. The Court
makes important decisions as a consent-based arbiter between
states, serving as an important body for states to solve crises.
However, the Court's past success and expertise will jeopardized
in the future if the Court begins to attempt to exercise
jurisdiction over nations such as Rwanda, which is in a use of
force dispute and has not consented. As Rwanda and other
states continue to ignore the Court, its legitimacy will wane
even in areas where it is currently strong. The ICJ does not
need to change to be more effective in use of force disputes; it
needs to recognize its role in the present international system
and focus on its strengths.
The ICJ had no choice but to rule for the DRC. It was
compelled to both by its own jurisdictional limits and legal
interpretation as well as practical policy goals. Undoubtedly,
the situation in the DRC is a tragic situation. However, the
critics of the Armed Activities decision not only disregard the
ICJ's jurisdictional rules but also the ICJ's role in the world.
The ICJ was not equipped to assert jurisdiction over Rwanda in
Armed Activities. Although the plight of the DRC and its people
deserves world recognition and a peaceful solution, the answer
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is not to use an institution which is not fit for solving those
types of crises. Instead, the answer is to reach a world
consensus and leave the ICJ doing what it does best: dispute
resolution between two consenting nations.

